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Abstract—Fuzzy extractor provides key generation from bio-
metrics and other noisy data. The generated key is seamlessly
usable for any cryptographic applications because its informa-
tion entropy is sufficient for security. Biometric authentication
offers natural and passwordless user authentication in various
systems where fuzzy extractors can be used for biometric
information security. Typically, a biometric system operates
in two modes: verification and identification. However, existing
fuzzy extractors does not support efficient user identification. In
this paper, we propose a succinct fuzzy extractor scheme which
enables efficient biometric identification as well as verification
that it satisfies the security requirements. We show that the
proposed scheme can be easily used in both verification and
identification modes. To the best of our knowledge, we propose
the first fuzzy extractor based biometric identification protocol.
The proposed protocol is able to identify a user with con-
stant computational cost rather than linear-time computation
required by other fuzzy extractor schemes. We also provide
security analysis of proposed schemes to show their security
levels. The implementation shows that the performance of
proposed identification protocol is constant and it is close to
that of verification protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
Biometric system has been widely used in various applica-
tions, such as mobile security, e-payment and identification
check [1]. A biometric system is essentially based on the
pattern recognition techniques which extract user’s biometric
features, and then compare with previously stored biometric
templates. For example, national police office may collect
citizen’s biometric information like fingerprint and facial
information for the security check. Presenting a finger on
biometric device, it usually transmits the biometric informa-
tion to an image, and apply recognition algorithms to extract
features. Then, the verification process searches a matching
template from the backend database and makes a decision.
There are some attractive features by using biometrics for
user authentication. First, biometric is naturally with people.
In practice, people are likely to have many different accounts
for emails, shopping, education, etc. A problem is to re-
spectively create and remember different secure passwords
for these accounts. Because secure password (e.g., j4U-
8x7AK5.#o0) is hard to remember [2], people can use their
biometric instead of password to perform authentication.
Second, biometrics can provide high level uniqueness and
security. Although there exists attacks (e.g., [3]) against the
security of biometric information, some biometrics (e.g., iris)
still remain in high security [4].
On the other hand, using biometric systems leads some
other security and privacy issues. First, biometric is usually
hard to be modified, so that it is not revocable once it has
been compromised. If an adversary steals user’s biometric
information, the user may lose the security forever. Bio-
hasing is a tool which offers revocability, while it requires
multi-factors for authentication [5]. Second, the accuracy of
recognition significantly impacts the decision of biometric
systems. For example, low accuracy biometric devices may
provide inaccurate information that an illegal user is able
to pass the authentication. Third, privacy sensitive users
concern the security of stored biometric information on
the authentication server. Certainly, no biometric (template)
information should be stored in plaintext. It is needed to
employ proper security protections on such data. Note that
data encryption cannot prevent insider attacks from the
authentication server.
Dodis et al. [6], [7] introduced the notion of secure
sketches and fuzzy extractors. Taking biometric information
Bio as input, a secure sketch scheme produces public
information which does not reveal the input. The public
information can be used to reproduce the original input Bio
if a close biometric information Bio′ is presented. Fuzzy
extractors take noisy input, including biometric information,
and generate a nearly uniform string (with some public
helper data) to be used directly in cryptographic applications.
For instance, the output string can be used as a private
key in public key based cryptographic schemes. Also, the
generated public helper data does not significantly leak the
information of input, i.e biometric information. By giving
the helper data and some biometric information close to
the original input, the same string is recoverable. Therefore,
fuzzy extractors are able to protect the security and privacy
of user’s biometric information.
A. Motivations and Contributions
Biometric systems typically operate in two modes: verifi-
cation mode and identification mode [8]. In the verification
mode, a user claims an identity and provides the biometric
for verification. The authentication server retrieves the user’s
record from the database. User and authentication server
runs biometric authentication protocol to check the validity
of user. Particularly, in fuzzy extractor based biometric
authentication protocols [9], [10], [11], the authentication
server retrieves user’s helper data and sends it to the user
with some challenges. If the user can recover a valid
secret string and responds the challenges, then the user is
authenticated. In the identification mode, a user provides
the biometric information and authentication server needs
to decide whether the user is valid. This mode is close
to the verification mode, but the difference is that the
verification mode requires a claimed identity with biometric.
Usually, the verification mode conducts 1-to-1 mapping,
while identification performs 1-to-N comparison. Note that
the terms ”verification” and ”authentication” are interchang-
ing in this paper that they both indicate a protocol runs in
the verification mode of biometric systems.
Biometric identification has been used in some scenarios
such as criminal watching-list and identity management
systems, because it is an intuitive method to solve the
problems. Fuzzy extractors provide security protections for
biometric systems, specifically the biometric information.
In user verification, existing fuzzy extractor schemes are
able to achieve a proper security level and they can be
used in authentication protocols. However, fuzzy extractor
based user identification could be inefficient. Consider that
user’s identity is unknown, the authentication server has to
conduct exhaustive search to find the identity. That is, the
fuzzy extractor and challenge-response verification will be
performed by many times. Moreover, fuzzy extractor based
protocols usually requires heavy computations like public
key based cryptographic operations. Note that it is possible
to apply lightweight symmetric key based cryptography
with fuzzy extractors, while the communication cost (for
helper data transmission) is still an issue. Therefore, fuzzy
extractors have not been used for user identification.
We focus on the gap between fuzzy extractors and other
approaches for biometric identification. Fuzzy extractor
based protocols need valid helper data to recover the secret.
Without providing user’s identity (in identification mode),
the server needs a computationally exhaustive search rather
than simple lookup. Hence, the computational time is linear,
i.e, O(n). It significantly influences identification perfor-
mance and restricts the use of fuzzy extractors in biometric
systems. This paper proposes a new fuzzy extractor scheme
which is succinct and it reduces the computational time to
constant during identification. We show that the proposed
scheme can be used in both verification and identification
modes. To the best of our knowledge, we propose the first
fuzzy extractor based biometric identification protocol. Also,
we provide security analysis for the proposed schemes and
protocols.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we review some background of fuzzy
extractors and describe notations used throughout this paper.
A. Fuzzy Extractor
Fuzzy extractor converts nonuniform data to uniformly
random strings which can be used in cryptographic applica-
tions. A typical application of fuzzy extractor is to extract
reproducible string from biometric information. The string
then is considered as a secret to authenticate people. This
section briefly reviews the fuzzy extractor introduced in [7].
1) Metric Space: A metric space is a set M with a
distance function dis :M×M→ R+ = [0,∞) which obeys
various properties, such as the triangle inequality dis(x, z) ≤
dis(x, y) + dis(y, z) and symmetry dis(x, y) = dis(y, x). In
previous work, Hamming distance, set difference and edit
distance have been used to construct fuzzy extractors.
2) Min-Entropy, Average Min-Entropy and Statistical Dis-
tance: The security of fuzzy extractors considers the entropy
of output strings. An adversary who attempts to predict a
random value is to guess the most likely value. The min-
entropy H∞(A) of a random variable A is
H∞(A) = − log(max
a
Pr[A = a]),
where maxa Pr[A = a] is the predictability of A. For
conditional distributions, we use the notion of average min-
entropy. It is the logarithm of predictability of A if a value
b of random variable B is given. The average min-entropy
H̃∞(A|B) of A given B is defined as following.
H̃∞(A|B) = − log
(
Eb←B
[
max
a
Pr[A = a|B = b]
])
= − log
(
Eb←B
[
2−H∞(A|B=b)
])
.
The statistical distance between two probability distribu-
tions A1 and A2 is
SD(A1, A2) =
1
2
∑
u
|Pr(A1 = u)− Pr(A2 = u)| .
The security of a fuzzy extractor usually considers the
statistical distance between a given distribution (from the
extractor) and a uniform distribution U .
3) Secure Sketches and fuzzy Extractors: Secure sketch
is a building block of fuzzy extractors. A secure sketch
scheme takes as input noisy information ω, such as biometric
information, then outputs a sketch s which is an auxiliary
string. Note that secure sketches and fuzzy extractors are
applicable to various noisy data other than biometric infor-
mation. Secure sketch schemes normally use error correcting
techniques to recover ω under s if and only if the given input
ω′ is close to ω. The sketch s can be published since it does
not reveal much information about ω.
Definition 1. A secure sketch consists of two randomized
procedures (SS,Rec) with the following properties.
• The sketch SS on input ω ∈ M outputs a sketch s ∈
{0, 1}∗.
• The function Rec on input an element ω′ ∈ M and a
sketch s ∈ {0, 1}∗ outputs ω if dis(ω, ω′) ≤ t, where t
is a threshold.
Fuzzy extractors extract some randomness from a noisy
input ω ∈ M. Then, it can also be recovered from a given
input ω′ if ω and ω′ are close. The difference is that fuzzy
extractors return a uniform string, but secure sketch returns
a non-uniform string.
Definition 2. A fuzzy extractor consists of two randomized
procedures (Gen,Rep) with the following properties.
• The generation function Gen on input x ∈ M outputs
a string R ∈ {0, 1}` and helper data P ∈ {0, 1}∗, such
that
Gen(x)→ (R,P ).
• The reproduction procedure Rep on input an element
x′ ∈ M and helper data P ∈ {0, 1}∗ outputs R, such
that
Rep(x′, P )→ R if dis(x, x′) ≤ t.
Because secure sketch can reconstruct the original input
from some given noisy data, it can be used to construct fuzzy
extractor schemes. Generally speaking, a fuzzy extractor can
be derived by using a secure sketch with a strong ran-
domness extractor. We now review a generic fuzzy extractor
construction from a secure sketch.
• Gen: Let SS be a secure sketch and Ext be a strong
extractor. Given an input x, Gen(x; r1, r2) → (P,R),
such that
P = (SS(x; r1), r2), R = Ext(x; r2).
• Rep: Given an noisy input x′ and P , recover the
original input x = Rec(x′,SS(x; r1)), then compute
R = Ext(x; r2).
B. Lp Norms
Let V be a vector space, norm is a function || · || which
assigns a strictly positive real number to a vector on V .
Given a distance function dis in metric space, if || · || is a
norm on V , then dis(x− x′) = ||x− x′|| is a metric on V .
Lp norm has been widely used in addressing pattern
recognition problems. It can be used to measure the distance
between two pieces of biometric information. In Euclidean
space, the associate norm is called L2 norm (p = 2) which
is a special case of Lp norm. Generally, the Lp norm is
||x|| =
(
n∑
i=1
|xi|p
) 1
p
.
If we consider the case p→∞, the norm L∞ = maxi(|xi|)
is called maximum norm. Chebyshev distance is an example
of using the maximum norm.
Definition 3. Given two vectors x = (x1, · · · , xn) and y =
(y1, · · · , yn), their Chebyshev distance is defined as
dis(x,y) = max
i
(|xi − yi|).
We say that x and y are close if dis(x,y) ≤ t, where t ∈ R+
is a threshold.
To describe the construction of proposed schemes and
protocols, we give some notations in TABLE I.
Bio: user’s biometric information.
BioD: a trusted biometric device.
DB: a database stores public information like helper data.
s≈s′: two vectors s and s′ are close according to some
measurement.
integer to a variable r.
KeyGen: a key generation algorithm of digital signatures.
Sign: a signing algorithm of digital signatures.
Verify: a verification algorithm of distal signatures.
dis(x,y): a function returns distance between x and y.
Table I
NOTATIONS.
III. BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION
Biometric information contains unique biological charac-
teristics of individuals. It enables people identification and
performs access control tasks. A user provides his biometric
template during the registration phase called enrollment.
When an identification is required, the user provides again
his biometric information to a trusted biometric device and
a new biometric template can be extracted. The user is
identified if and only if the new biometric template is close
to one of the stored templates. That is, the differences
between two templates are smaller than a threshold. To
compare two templates, an authentication server (AS) can
search the stored biometric templates and check if the
received template is close to any of the records.
User privacy and biometric template security are impor-
tant problems. The server has to guarantee the security of the
system, otherwise a user’s privacy and biometric information
security will be compromised. Unfortunately, it is hard to
create a fully trusted system and a client may not trust
remote servers.
Fuzzy extractor is a candidate to solve the security and
privacy issues regarding biometric template. Biometric tem-
plate is converted to some public helper data which does
not need to be securely stored. Also, the stored data leaks
negligible information about biometric template. Note that it
differs from the biohashing which usually requires additional
password or token to perform verification [5].
Biometric identification protocol consists of the follow-
ing algorithm and protocols: System Setup (SysSetup),
User enrollment (UserEnro) and Biometric Identification
(BioIden).
• SysSetup: Taking as input a security parameter λ, it
generates system public parameters params.
• UserEnro: Taking as input a user’s identity ID and
user’s biometric information Bio, it generates a pair
of public and private keys (pk, sk) and some helper
data P . The public information (ID, pk, P ) is given
to the authentication server, while the private key sk
is discarded immediately. This protocol is played by a
user, biometric device and authentication server.
• BioIden: Taking as input user’s biometric information
Bio, it outputs and user’s identity if the user is identi-
fied, otherwise it outputs ⊥.
We briefly describe enrollment and identification phases
of fuzzy extractor based biometric identification. In enroll-
ment phase, a user provides his biometric information Bio
to a biometric device. The device extracts some helper data
P and a string sk which is the user’s private key. Then the
user generates the corresponding public key pk and gives it
to the server. Note that the server only stores (ID, P, pk)
that the string sk is unknown. In identification phase, a
user plays a challenge-response protocol (BioIden) with the
authentication server. At the end of protocol run, user’s
identity is revealed or the identification failed.
IV. SUCCINCT FUZZY EXTRACTOR
This section describes the concrete constructions of pro-
posed secure sketch and fuzzy extractor schemes.
A. Number Line
Chebyshev distance is applied in our proposed fuzzy
extractor to recover the original input from a noisy input.
It is a new approach (for fuzzy extractors) different from
the previous methods, such as the Hamming distance and
setting distance. To use the Chebyshev distance, we firstly
define a number line to express vector elements of biometric
information. Each element of a vector is a point of the
following number line.
Definition 4. We define a number line La as follows
−4a −3a −2a 2a 3a 4a0 a−a
Ij = aIi = −3a
where a ∈ R+ is a unit and 0 is the middle point
of La. Let points (. . . ,−3a,−a, a, 3a, . . . ) be odd points
and (. . . ,−2a, 0, 2a, . . . ) be even points. We define an
interval on above number line as (b, b + 2a), where b is
an even point. I is the identifier of an interval, where
I = . . . ,−3a,−a, a, 3a, . . . . Indeed, an interval is identified
by its middle (even or odd) point. More generally, an
interval of La is (b, b+ ka) that it contains k units, where
k ∈ {2, 4, 6, . . . }. For example, the following number line
La is divided by intervals where k = 4.
−4a −3a −2a 2a 3a 4a0 a−a
I = 2a
B. Secure Sketch Based on the Maximun Norm
A secure sketch scheme consists of two algorithms:
Sketch (SS) and Reconstruction (Rec). We also show the
system setup Setup for the proposed secure sketch.
• Setup: Let La be a number line as in Definition 4. We
assume that all points on La are integers and La has
exactly v intervals, where v > 1. Note that it is not
necessary to have this assumption, but it simplifies the
security analysis. For each interval (b, b + ka), there
are ka− 1 points such that b+ 1, . . . , b+ ka− 2, b+
ka− 1. The maximum acceptable Chebyshev distance
(threshold) is t < ka2 .
• SS(x) → s: Assume that user’s biometric information
has been encoded into a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn),
where xi is a point of La.
– For all xi ∈ {x1, . . . , xn}, move xi by si to the
closest interval identifier Ii, such that
Ii = xi + si,
where |si| ≤ ka2 . It sets and returns the extracted
sketch s = (s1, . . . , sn), which can be published.
– Special case 1: If xi is a point (e.g., xi = 0) which
does not in any interval, it flips a coin c and moves
xi to the closest left interval identifier if c = 0,
otherwise moves to the right.
– Special case 2: If xi is the largest point, it is moved
to either xi − ka2 or −xi +
ka
2 based on the coin
c. It is similar if xi is the smallest point. That is,
La can be considered as a ring.
• Rec(y, s) → z: Taking as input a user’s biometric
information which has been encoded into a vector
y = (y1, . . . , yn), where yi is a point of La, and a
sketch s, the recovery procedure Rec(y, s) is as follows.
– For all yi ∈ {y1, . . . , yn} and si ∈ {s1, . . . , sn},
compute
y′i = yi + si.
if y′i >
kav
2 , then calculate y
′
i = y
′
i − ka.
if y′i < −kav2 , then calculate y
′
i = y
′
i + ka.
– For all y′i ∈ {y′1, . . . , y′n}, find the identifier Ii of
interval which contains y′i.
If |Ii− y′i| > t, it aborts the algorithm and returns
⊥, otherwise, it computes, for i = 1, . . . , n,
zi = Ii − si.
Then, it returns the vector z = (z1, . . . , zn).
We now show the correctness of above secure sketch
scheme.
Theorem 1 (Correctness). The proposed secure sketch
scheme recovers the vector y to x by given a sketch s if
and only if SS(x) → s and dis(x,y) ≤ t, where t is the
maximum acceptable Chebyshev distance.
Proof: Given two n-dimensional vectors x =
(x1, . . . , xn) and y = (y1, . . . , yn), such that xi, yi are the
points of the number line La, t is defined as in Setup. Let
x be the input vector of SS and y be the input of Rec.
|si| ≤ ka2 is the movement from xi to its interval identifier
Ii. If dis(x,y) ≤ t, for all xi ∈ x, yi ∈ y, |xi−yi| ≤ t holds
by the definition of Chebyshev distance. Then, we have the
following equations. Ii = xi + si,y′i = yi + si,
Ii − t ≤ y′i ≤ Ii + t.
Obviously, the point y′i is in the interval
(
Ii − ka2 , Ii +
ka
2
)
because t < ka2 . According to the recovery procedure, the
output point zi can be computed as
zi = Ii − si = xi.
Therefore, the original input x can be recovered by using
Rec.
Assume that dis(x,y) > t, for at least one pair (xi, yi),
we have the following inequalities.
yi + si < xi + si − t,
or
yi + si > xi + si + t.
The computed point y′i /∈ [Ii−t, Ii+t] and zi 6= xi, so that x
cannot be recovered by given y if the distance between x and
y exceeds the threshold t. Thus, if and only if dis(x,y) ≤ t
and SS(x)→ s, x can be recovered by using y.
C. Fuzzy Extractor Scheme
A secure sketch scheme can be converted to a fuzzy
extractor scheme by using the generic construction intro-
duced in Section II. This paper adopts a variant generic
construction because of some weaknesses.
Boyen et al. [10] pointed out a problem of normal secure
sketches and fuzzy extractors. Public helper data is stored
and transmitted without any security protection mechanisms.
An active adversary can modify the helper data and no
security guarantees are provided in this case. Hence, they
introduced a concept of robust secure sketch that such
schemes can detect the modification of helper data during the
recovery procedure. A generic construction of robust secure
sketch (in the random oracle model) is also provided for any
secure sketch which satisfies certain technical properties. We
now review the proposed generic construction in [10].
• Setup: Let H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l be a hash function.
The setup procedure is the same as a given well-formed
secure sketch (SS′,Rec′).
• SS(x)→ s: Take as input some biometric information
x and the sketching algorithm SS′, it computes as
follows.
1) SS′(x)→ s′,
2) h = H(x, s′),
3) return s = (s′, h).
• Rec(y, s)→ x: Take as input some biometric informa-
tion y, the helper data s and the recovery algorithm
Rec′, it computes as follows.
1) Rec′(y, s′)→ x′,
2) if x′ = ⊥, return ⊥,
3) if H(x′, s′) 6= h, return ⊥, otherwise, return x =
x′.
Note that parameters x, y, s and s′ are vectors.
We also applies the above generic construction to convert
the proposed secure sketch scheme.
• Setup: Let La be a number line as in Definition
4. H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l is a collision-resistant
cryptographic hash function. La is assumed to contain
exactly v intervals. The range of the number line La is
[−kav2 ,
kav
2 ], where k = 2, 4, 6, . . . . The threshold is t,
such that t < ka2 .
• SS: Take as input some biometric information x, it
runs the sketch algorithm of Section IV-B and gains
the output a vector (s1, . . . , sn). Then, it computes
h = H(x, s1, . . . , sn) and returns s = (s1, . . . , sn, h).
• Rec: Take as input some biometric information y and
a sketch s, such that s = (s1, . . . , sn, h), it runs the
reconstruction Rec in Section IV-B and returns z if
h = H(z, s1, . . . , sn).
Now, we can obtain a fuzzy extractor scheme. The proposed
fuzzy extractor consists of three algorithms: System Setup
(Setup), Generation procedure (Gen) and Reproduction
Procedure (Rep).
• Setup: Let Ext be a strong extractor. It runs the same
system setup of robust secure sketch.
• Gen: Given biometric information x, it selects an `-bit
random string r ∈ {0, 1}` and runs SS algorithm of
robust secure sketch and obtains s. Then, it computes
R = Ext(x, r) and sets the public helper data P =
(s, r). The algorithm returns (R,P ).
• Rep: Given biometric information y and helper data
P , the algorithm runs Rec algorithm of robust secure
sketch and obtains the output z. Then, it reproduces the
string R by computing E(z, r).
The correctness of proposed fuzzy extractor scheme holds
because the underlying secure sketch is correct. We analyze
the security of proposed secure sketch and fuzzy extractor
in Section VI-A.
V. PROPOSED BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION PROTOCOL
In this section, we show that the proposed fuzzy extractor
can be used to construct an efficient biometric identification
User BioD AS
ID,Bio−−−−→
Gen(Bio)→ (R,P )
P = (s, r)
KeyGen(R)→ (sk, pk)
ID,pk,P−−−−→
Store (ID, pk, P )
Figure 1. User enrollment.
User BioD AS (DB)
Bio−−−−→
request−−−−→
Retrieve
(IDi, pki, Pi)
ci
$← Z
i = 1, 2, . . . , n
Pi,ci←−−−−
ski ← Rep(Bio, Pi)
ai
$← Z
σi ← Sign(ci, ai)
σ,a−−−−→
Verify(σi, ci, ai)
Figure 2. Fuzzy extractor based biometric identification protocol in normal
approach.
protocol. Typically, a fuzzy extractor based biometric iden-
tification protocol (e.g., Fig. 2) may need to be performed
O(n) times for identification. For example, an authentication
server has to exhaustively test records of helper data, because
it does not know which record is with respect to the
user. This is also the major difference from the biometric
verification where an identifier like user’s identity is pro-
vided. Note that request is to retrieve helper data without
sacrificing user’s biometric information. However, we apply
the proposed fuzzy extractor and secure sketch in a slightly
different manner. To identify a user, the proposed protocol
firstly compares the received sketch with the records in
database. It avoids to conduct heavy computations (for
public key cryptography) of the protocol. In our protocol,
the computational time for user identification is constant. We
now provide the details of our protocol (Fig. 3) as follows.
• SysSetup: The authentication server chooses a security
parameter λ and generates a number line La and the
maximum acceptable Chebyshev distance t. It chooses
a collision-resistant cryptographic hash function H :
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l and a strong extractor Ext. Then, it
sets params = (La, t,H,Ext) and publishes params.
• UserEnro: To register a user (Fig. 1), this protocol
runs as follows among the user, biometric device and
authentication server.
User BioD AS (DB)
Bio−−−−→
s′ ← SS(Bio)
s′−−−−→
Search in DB
s.t. s≈s′
obtain (ID, pk, P )
c
$← Z
P,c←−−−−
sk ← Rep(Bio, P )
a
$← Z
σ ← Sign(c, a)
σ,a−−−−→
Verify(σ, c, a)
Figure 3. Proposed biometric identification protocol.
User→BioD: The user presents its identity ID and
biometric information Bio to the biometric device.
Note that the biometric device is connected with other
devices which can take input for identity information
and it communicates with the authentication server.
BioD→AS: Upon receiving (ID,Bio), BioD runs the
algorithm Gen and outputs (R,P ), where R is a secret
string and P = (s, r) is helper data. Let sk be the
private key of a signature scheme. It derives the corre-
sponding public key pk by running the KeyGen. BioD
sends (ID, pk, P ) to AS and erases (ID,Bio, sk)
immediately.
AS: It inserts the record (ID, pk, P ) into the DB.
• BioIden: To identify a user, biometric device, user and
authentication server interact as follows.
User→BioD: The user present its biometric information
Bio to BioD.
BioD→AS: Upon receiving a user’s biometric informa-
tion Bio, BioD runs the algorithm SS and outputs a
sketch s′. It sends s′ to AS.
AS→BioD: Upon receiving the sketch s′, AS searches
s from the database, such that for all si ∈ s, s′i ∈ s′, it
satisfies any of the following conditions.
si > 0, s
′
i > 0 : |si − s′i| ∈ [0, t] (1)
si ≤ 0, s′i ≤ 0 : |si − s′i| ∈ [0, t] (2)
si > 0, s
′
i ≤ 0 : |si − s′i − ka| /∈ (t, ka− t) (3)
si ≤ 0, s′i > 0 : |si − s′i + ka| /∈ (t, ka− t) (4)
Note that the above computations can be avoided by
performing some pre-computations, i.e, the server only
needs to check whether s′i is in the specific range. Then,
AS retrieves the record (ID, pk, P ) and randomly
chooses a challenge c ∈ Z. AS sends (P, c) to BioD.
If there does not exist a valid record, the identification
failed and outputs ⊥.
BioD→AS: Upon receiving (P, c), BioD runs the algo-
rithm Rep to recover the private key sk and chooses a
random nonce a ∈ Zp. It generates a signature σ of the
message (c, a) by using the signature algorithm Sign.
BioD responds (σ, a) to AS.
AS: Upon receiving the response (σ, a), AS verifies the
response by running the signature verification algorithm
Verify. If the σ is valid, the identification succeeds,
otherwise it is failed.
During the identification process, AS needs to search in the
database for the corresponding helper data. We show that
the computational time of this process is constant. In other
words, AS does not need to exhaustively conduct “compute-
then-compare” mode.
Theorem 2 (Correctness of Conditions). Given two bio-
metric information (Bio,Bio′), a number line La with
parameters (v, k, a) and two sketches (si, s′i) ∈ (s, s′),
where SS(Bio)→ s and SS(Bio′) → s, (si, s′i) satisfies
one of the conditions (1)− (4) if Bio and Bio′ are close.
Proof: Since Bio and Bio′ are close, for all pairs of
(xi, x
′
i) ∈ (Bio,Bio′), |xi − x′i| ≤ t. Clearly, if points xi
and x′i move towards the same direction, the movement si
and s′i are respectively the distances to the same interval
identifier Ii. Based on the sketch algorithm, we have the
equation
xi + si = x
′
i + s
′
i.
So that we have,
• If si > 0, s′i > 0, then |si − s′i| = |x′i − xi| ∈ [0, t].
• If si ≤ 0, s′i ≤ 0, then |si − s′i| = |x′i − xi| ∈ [0, t].
Another case is that two points are moved to different
direction during the sketch procedure.
In condition (3), since si > 0, s′i ≤ 0, then there are two
cases.
• If xi and x′i are in the same interval, then they are
moved to the same identifier Ii. Then,
si − s′i = |si − s′i| = |xi − x′i| ∈ [0, t].
So that
|si − s′i − ka| = ka− (si − s′i) ∈ [ka− t, ka].
• If xi and x′i are in different intervals Ii and I
′
i ,
respectively, we have Ii = I ′i ± ka, that is,
xi + si = x
′
i + s
′
i ± ka.
If xi + si = x′i + s
′
i + ka, we have x
′
i ≤ xi. Then,
|si − s′i − ka| = ka− (si − s′i)
= ka− (x′i − xi + ka)
= xi − x′i.
So that |si − s′i − ka| ∈ [0, t]. Such range is also [0, t],
if xi + si = x′i + s
′
i − ka. Because the range of si and
s′i are (0,
ka
2 ] and [−
ka
2 , 0], the value |si − s
′
i − ka| is
in [0, ka]. Therefore, |si − s′i − ka| /∈ (t, ka − t) and
condition (3) holds.
If si ≤ 0, s′i > 0, the proof is similar to the above. We
also have that |si − s′i + ka| /∈ (t, ka− t) and condition (4)
holds.
Finally, if two biometric information Bio and Bio′ are
close, the corresponding sketch elements satisfy one of
conditions (1)− (4).
It is important to notice that two sketches which satisfy
these conditions does not result in two close biometric
information. Because the same movement s could be per-
formed in different intervals. Two biometric points xi and
x′i (in different intervals), such that dis(xi, x
′
i) > a, have a
probability to obtain the sketches which satisfy one of condi-
tions (1)− (4). Now, we show this probability theoretically.
Assume that a number line La has exactly v intervals. Given
a biometric point, there are at most 2t+1 valid close points,
while the total number of “close” points are (2t+1)v. That
means there are many false close points in other intervals. If
we consider the distribution of biometric points is uniformly
at random, each point is “close” to another point with the
probability (2t+1)vkav . Note that biometric information usually
contains many points, say n. Let the event E be two pieces
of biometric information output a false close. We have the
probability of E
Pr[E] =
(
(2t+ 1)v
kav
)n
−
(
2t+ 1
kav
)n
=
(2t+ 1)n(vn − 1)
(kav)n
<
(
(2t+ 1)v
kav
)n
=
(
2t+ 1
ka
)n
.
Therefore, the probability Pr[E] is negligible and the sketch
comparison can be used to find helper data.
VI. SECURITY MODELS AND ANALYSIS
The security of biometric information is important in
biometric authentication protocols. To analyze the security
of the proposed schemes, we firstly describe the security
models, including the capability of adversaries and aim of
attacks, etc. Secondly, we will formally prove the security of
proposed schemes. Theoretical (provably secure) analysis is
important and it shows the security level of schemes. Note
that system failure due to effects, such as denial-of-service
and intrusion, are beyond the scope of this paper.
A. Security of Fuzzy Extractors
The proposed secure sketch is used as a building block of
our fuzzy extractors. To show the security level of secure
sketch scheme, we consider an adversary who aims to
recover the input from a given sketch. That is, we assume
that an adversary can obtain and manipulate sketches in
some manners. Formally, the advantage of this adversary
is captured by using information entropy.
Definition 5 ([7]). A secure sketch is (M,m, m̃, t)-secure
if for any distribution W over metric space M with min-
entropy m, an adversary has an advantage at most 2−m̃,
where m̃ ≤ H̃∞(W |SS(W )), to recover the value of W .
The security of fuzzy extractors is considered based on
the statistical indistinguishability of two distributions.
Definition 6 ([7]). A fuzzy extractor is (M,m, `, t, ε)-secure
if for any input distribution W over metric space M with
min-entropy m, the output string (excludes helper data) is
in distribution R, the statistical distance between R and
uniform distribution U` is negligible even if the helper data
P is given, that is SD((R,P ), (U`, P )) ≤ ε, where ε is
negligible.
An adversary against fuzzy extractors is able to read all
public information, especially the helper data of users. Then,
the adversary aims to either recover the user’s biometric
information or reproduce the secret string which is an output
of fuzzy extractor. It is clear that if an adversary is able to
reconstruct biometric information, then the secret string is
recoverable. Hence, we consider the adversary who aims to
find the secret string. We now show the security analysis of
our proposed secure sketch and fuzzy extractor scheme.
Theorem 3 (Security). The proposed (SS,Rec) is an
(La, n log kav, n log v, t)-secure sketch, where v is the num-
ber of intervals of La. The entropy loss is n log ka and the
storage is n log(ka+ 1). Both the sketch algorithm SS and
recovery algorithm Rec run in polynomial time in n, k, a
and v.
Proof: To recover a point xi ∈ x, an adversary needs
to obtain the interval index Ii of xi and the corresponding
movement si. Since the helper data s is known to the
adversary, it is easy to recover a point if its interval is given.
Assume that the distribution of encoded points is uniformly
on La [12], the best strategy of an adversary is to guess
the interval of xi. Let the parameters of La be (k, v, a)
Since that there are v intervals on the number line La, the
number of points on La is kav, because −kav2 is considered
the same as the point kav2 . The min-entropy m of input
information x = (x1, . . . , xn) is n log kav. Given a helper
data si ∈ s, the probability of recovering the corresponding
xi is Pr[X = xi|S = si].
In the sketch algorithm, a point xi, where xi is not an
even point, has the only way of movement. Recall that the
number line La is in range [−kav2 ,
kav
2 ]. The movement si
is deterministic if such xi is given. For even points, they
can be randomly moved to either the closest right or left
interval identifier. Let (xi, si) be a pair of input point and
the corresponding movement. Then, we have
Pr[S = si|X = xi] =
{
1 if xi 6= ka(2α−v)2 , α = 0, . . . , v;
1
2 otherwise.
On the other hand, the value of xi is probabilistic if si is
given. The probability of choosing xi is Pr[X = xi] = 1kav .
To discuss the security of the secure sketch, it is needed
to calculate the average min-entropy H̃∞(X|S) which is
related to the maximum probability of Pr[X = xi|S = si].
There are two cases (|si| = ka2 ; |si| 6=
ka
2 ) for all si. We
show the probabilities of both cases as follows.
Case 1 (|si| 6= ka2 ):
max
xi
Pr[X = xi|S = si]
=
Pr[S = si|X = xi] Pr[X = xi]∑n
j=1 Pr[S = si|X = xj ] Pr[X = xj ]
=
1× 1kav
1
kav (Pr[S = si|X = x1] + · · ·+ Pr[S = si|X = xn]
=
1
(0 + 0 + · · ·+ 0 + 1) + · · ·+ (0 + 0 + · · ·+ 0 + 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
v
=
1
v
.
Case 2 (|si| = ka2 ):
max
xi
Pr[X = xi|S = si]
=
1
2 ×
1
kav
1
kav (Pr[S = si|X = x1] + · · ·+ Pr[S = si|X = xn]
=
1
(0 + 0 + · · ·+ 0 + 1
2
) + · · ·+ (0 + 0 + · · ·+ 0 + 1
2
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
v
=
1
v
.
According to the above equations, the maximum prob-
abilities of recovering xi, when si is given, are the same
for all si ∈ [−ka2 ,
ka
2 ]. Because the elements of vector
x = (x1, . . . , xn) are independent, the average min-entropy
of the proposed secure sketch can be computed as
H̃∞(X|S) = −n log
(
Esi←S
[
max
xi
Pr[X = xi|S = si]
])
= n log v.
The entropy loss of our secure sketch is
m− H̃(X|S) = n log kav − n log v = n log ka.
The outputs size of the sketch s is n log (ka+ 1).
According to the analysis, the security of our secure
sketch is related to the amount v of intervals and the number
n of points of vector x. The security can be enhanced by
increasing v and n.
The security of proposed robust secure sketch depends
on the security of generic construction and the underlying
secure sketch. Because the basic secure sketch scheme is
proved secure, the proposed robust secure sketch is secure
followed by the security analysis of [10].
Theorem 4. The proposed fuzzy extractor scheme is secure
if the proposed secure sketch is secure.
Proof: The proof is obvious. We use the generic con-
struction [7] to derive the fuzzy extractor scheme from the
proposed secure sketch. The generic construction guarantees
the security of such fuzzy extractors. Since that the secure
sketch scheme is (La, n log kav, n log v, t) secure, the ob-
tained fuzzy extractor scheme is also secure. In other words,
the output sting R is indistinguishable with a string R′ which
is generated uniformly at random.
B. Security of Biometric Identification Protocols
In this section, we describe the security model of fuzzy
extractor based biometric identification protocols. Firstly,
we show the capabilities of adversaries by giving particular
access to resources.
• An adversary is able to eavesdrop communication chan-
nel between the authentication server and biometric
device.
• An adversary is able to manipulate on interactive mes-
sages over the communication channel. For instance, a
message can be modified, injected or deleted.
• An (insider) adversary is able to access public helper
data stored on the authentication server.
In analysis, biometric device is assumed to be secure with
temper-resistant protections. If a biometric device is compro-
mised, then any user who operate on the machine is under
attack. Also, user’s biometric information is unknown to an
adversary because it plays as a secret key like password in
single-factor authentication systems. Note that if biometric
is used with other factors, such as token, the assumption can
be relaxed [13], [14].
An attacker against biometric identification protocols aims
to be identified as the target user without its biometric infor-
mation. Biometric identification is different from traditional
credential based identification. False accept is likely to occur
due to various reasons. For example, the accuracy of biomet-
ric extraction can significantly influence the identification
result. In particular, face recognition could have difficulties
to distinguish twins. However, these issues can be relieved
by using multiple types of biometrics, such as fingerprint
and iris.
Theorem 5. The proposed biometric identification protocol
is secure if the underlying secure sketch, fuzzy extractor and
digital signature scheme are secure.
Proof: The protocol is played by user, biometric device
and the authentication server. Assume that user has regis-
tered by using the protocol UserEnro. A record (ID, pk, P )
is stored in the database. If the employed digital signature
is secure, then the private key sk, which is the secret string
of fuzzy extractor’s output, is not recoverable because the
proposed fuzzy extractor is secure. During the identification,
biometric device runs SS algorithm and obtains a user’s
sketch s. Since that the proposed secure sketch is proved
secure, an adversary cannot reveal the information of user’s
biometric. Upon receiving a sketch s′, the server identifies
a user without knowing biometric information. By using a
secure digital signature scheme, if and only if the user can
recover the private key sk, it can generate a valid response.
So that, the proposed biometric identification protocol is
secure.
VII. IMPLEMENTATIONS AND PERFORMANCES
To evaluate the performance, we implement the proposed
secure sketch scheme, fuzzy extractor and identification
protocol. The implementation is conducted by using Python
on Linux computer (CPU: Intel Core i5-5300U@2.3GHz;
Memory: 2GB; Virtual Machine). The conducted perfor-
mance test aims to show the (speed) performance compari-
son between the proposed protocol and the normal approach
(e.g., Fig. 2). The test assumes that user biometric data has
been converted into the format needed, because the data
conversion is exactly the same in two protocols. Note that
both the proposed protocol and the normal approach use
the same format of data as input. Also, the representation
(depends on feature extraction algorithms) of biometric data
could be vary. Without loss of generality, we use simulated
data which is independent from any type of biometric. It is
clear to show the speed difference between two protocols.
Table II introduces the parameters used in the implemen-
tation. The number line La consists of three parameters a,
k and v. For an interval, there are at least 2 units, that
is k = 2. However, this setting cannot achieve constant
identification in the protocol. According to the probability
of false close biometric information, the value of k should
be k ∈ {4, 6, . . . }. The maximum acceptable Chebyshev
distance t (the threshold) is set to a for the simplicity. The
implementation tested different size of input. The dimension
n of input data is selected from 1, 000 to 31, 000 and rep-
resentation range of an element is [−100000, 100000]. The
result shows that dimensions have negligible impact to the
protocol performance. Assume that biometric features have
been extracted. In verification mode, one protocol execution
for user verification needs 99 milliseconds (n = 5000). Note
that feature extraction time could vary according to different
biometrics. Also, a fuzzy extractor is hard to handle all types
of biometrics [15]. The proposed protocol can be used with
some biometrics such as face and fingerprint.
Figure 4. Speed of identification protocol.
In identification mode, the identification speed is signifi-
cantly improved. Fig. 4 shows the comparison between the
proposed protocol and normal method of fuzzy extractor
based identification protocols. In the experiment, we assume
that the database of helper data has been downloaded, so
that the network transmission time is omitted. Because
the proposed protocol uses the secure sketch scheme to
identify helper data, only one digital signature computation
is needed. It reduces the computational time to nearly
constant. We obtains that the identification time is around
110 milliseconds which is close to the speed in verification
mode. Therefore, the proposed identification protocol offers
efficient user identification.
Parameter Value
a 100
k 4
v 500
n 1000 - 31, 000
t 100
Rep. Range [−100000, 100000]
m̃ ≈ 44, 829 bits (n = 5, 000)
Storage ≈ 45, 000 bits (n = 5, 000)
Random Extractor SHA256
Signature scheme Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)
Table II
IMPLEMENTATION PARAMETERS OF OUR PROTOCOL.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Juels and Wattenberg [16] introduced a new type of
cryptographic primitive called fuzzy commitment scheme. It
combines both the techniques of cryptography and error cor-
recting codes. The proposed commitment scheme is based
on the Hamming distance and it is a basis of later code-
offset sketch schemes. Juels and Sudan proposed a fuzzy
vault scheme in [17], which is using the set difference
to measure given biometric information. The fuzzy vault
scheme randomly creates a secret k degree polynomial
p(x) during the sketch generation procedure. Given valid
biometric information, a user can regenerate the polynomial.
Assume that the amount of chaff points is large enough,
an adversary has a negligible probability to recover the
polynomial by given the set of chaff points.
Boyen [9], [18] showed that many constructions of fuzzy
extractors are not secure against specific attacks. If a user
has multiple sketches from the same sketch scheme, his
biometric information can be leaked. The corresponding
issue is called reusability of fuzzy extractors. The notion
of adaptive chosen perturbation attacks was introduced and
both of outsider and insider attackers were discussed. Then,
a generic fuzzy sketch based on permutation groups was
proposed. Note that the construction is provably secure in
the random oracle model.
Apart from the above attacks, another type of active
attack was considered. Boyen et al. [10] pointed out that
the security of secure sketches and fuzzy extractors cannot
be guaranteed if the public helper data was modified. So that
they introduced a new concept called robust sketches. It can
detect the modified auxiliary data and abort the algorithm
immediately. They provided a generic conversion from a
secure sketch, which satisfies certain technical properties,
to a robust sketch in the random oracle model. The first
construction of robust fuzzy extractors secure in the standard
model was proposed by Dodis et al. [19], [20].
In terms of metric spaces, there are two directions to
construct fuzzy extractors. The mentioned references above
focused on discrete metric spaces, meanwhile some other
work utilized continuous metric spaces. Linnartz and Tuyls
[21] proposed a biometric authentication system which con-
sidered the continuous space Rn. The security analysis of
secure sketches which are based on continuous domains is
different from secure sketches use discrete domains. Li et
al. [22] studied the problems of secure sketches related to
continuous domains and introduced a new concept of relative
entropy loss.
IX. CONCLUSION
Fuzzy extractors protect the security of biometric infor-
mation. In verification mode, user claims its identity and
retrieves the helper data to recover the secret. However, a
gap between fuzzy extractor based biometric system and
other approaches is that there is no construction for efficient
biometric identification. In scenarios where user’s identity is
unknown, the computational time for identification is O(n).
We proposed a set of schemes, including secure sketch,
fuzzy extractor and an identification protocol. The exper-
iment shows that our fuzzy extractor based identification
protocol runs in around 110 ms which is close to the speed
(99 ms) of verification.
The security of proposed protocol underlies on the se-
curity of secure sketch and fuzzy extractor scheme. We
theoretically analyzed the security level of these schemes
and showed that they are provably secure.
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